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Narratology and Theory of  Fiction: 
Remarks on a Complex Relationship 
In his book Fiction and Diction, Gerard Genette bemoans a contradiction 
between the pretense and the practice of narratological research I. Instead 
of studying  all  kind  of narratives,  for  Genette,  narratological  research 
concentrates de facta on the techniques of fictional narrative. Correspond-
ingly, Genette speaks of a "fictional narratology,,2 in the pejorative sense 
of a discipline that sets arbitrary limits on its area of study. In his objec-
tion, the narratology that literary scholars practice considers fictional nar-
rative to be at least the standard case of any narrative
3
•  In other words, 
what is  merely a special case, within a wide field  of narratives,  is here 
elevated to  narrative par excellence
4
•  According to Genette, narratology 
1  Cf. Genette (1993: 54). 
2  "Or, quels que soient, au stade oil nous sommes, les mcrites et les defauts de la narra-
tologie  fictionnelle  [ ...  ]," Genette  (1991:  66);  the  expression  "narratologie  fiction-
nelle,"  unfortunately,  is  not  preserved  in  the  English  translation:  "Now,  whatever 
strengths  and  weaknesses  narratology  may  have  in  its  current state  [  ...  ]," Genette 
(1993: 53). 
3  Cf. Genette (1993: 54f.). 
4  Except for the late Gerard Genette, Dietrich Weber is one of the few  narratologists to 
emerge  from  Iiterary  studies  who  explicitly  argues  against  an  exclusion  of non-
fictional  narratives from  narrative theory.  He takes literary narratives in  general, fic-
tional as weil as non-fictional ("künstlerische Erzählliteratur, mag sie nun fiktional sein 
oder nicht"), to be the subject matter of Iiterary narrative theory: Weber (1998: 7f.). A 
similar position  can  be  found  in  Lamping  (2000),  particularly  217-19.  However,  a 
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does not omit the domain of non-fictional narratives from  its  investiga-
tions with any justification, but rather annexes it without addressing its 
specific elements. 
What are possible ways in which this perspective, which Genette criti-
cizes as truncated, can be set right? Can the problem, as outlined, siinply 
be solved by expanding the area of study in narratological research? Or 
are there not, perhaps, important differences between fictional and nonfic-
tional narratives which seem to encourage narratological research, und  er-
stood as a fundamental discipline of literary study, under the heading of 
"fictional narratology"? 
In order to come to an answer here, we will first discuss the problem 
of  differentiating between fictional and non-fictional narratives, as weil as 
the possibility of a connection between narrative and fictionality theory. 
Second, we will expand our considerations to encompass pragmatic and 
historical aspects of narratives in order to delineate the scope of our pro-
posal. 
1. 
Are there any characteristics of fictionality that do not depend upon con-
text? As is weil known, the  discussion of this question is  controversial 
among narratologists and philosophers of language. On one side-just to 
name the two classic antipodes--is Käte Hamburger, who, in her Logik 
der Dichtung (1957), attempts to work out a linguistic-philosophical basis 
for thc singular phenomenon of fictional  speech. John R. Searle formu-
lates the counterposition. Based on J. L. Austin's remarks on literary dis-
course  as  consisting  of feigned  assertions,  he  understands  fictional 
sentences as unserious "make-believe" and argues, in "Tbe Logical Status 
of Fictional Discourse," that "[t]here is no textual property [ ...  ] that will 
identify a text as a work offiction"s. 
For any attempt to connect fiction theory with narratology, a radically 
relativistic  approach in the wake  of Searle offers  little  help.  But what 
about Käte Hamburger's Logik der Dichtung? Let us examine what the 
5 
one  of the  consequences  of such  an  expansion,  cf.  for  example  Cobley  (2001); 
BlayerlSanchez (2002). 
Searle (J975: 325). 
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'·'most brilliant representative of  neo-Aristotelian poetics of  our time,,6 can 
attribute to such an attempt. 
Hamburger  develops  her  position  in  sharp  contrast  to  Hans  Vai-
hinger's  Philosophie  des  Als  Ob
7  and  Roman  Ingarden's  concept of 
"quasi-judgement" ("Quasi-Urteil") as developed in his Das literarische 
Kunstwerk
8
•  Contrary to  Vaihinger and  Ingarden,  Hamburger rejects  to 
explain the phenomenon of literary fiction on the basis of the concept of 
"as  .though," because this would imply an element of  deception: 
But Schiller did not form his character Marias Stuart as if she were the real Maria. If 
we nevertheless perceive her, or the world of any drama or novel, as  tictive, this is 
based not on an as-ifstructure, but rather, so we might say, on an as-structure
9
• 
Tbe definition of fiction in the sense of an "as-structure" is central to 
Hamburger's position. In order to demonstrate its theoretical assumptions 
and  implications,  Hamburger makes  use  of a  formulation  by  Theodor 
Fontane: 
Theodor Fontane unwittingly once gave this definition of literary fiction: "A novel ... 
should teil us a story in which we believe," and he meant by that that it ought to "al-
low us a world offiction to momentarily appear as a world ofreality"lO. 
For Hamburger, the expression "to momentarily appear as a world of 
reality" precisely defines the state of literary  fiction  as "appeatance or 
semblance of reality,"ll  although she  understands this phrase in a  much 
broader and, finally, different sense than it possesses in Fontane's realism. 
Differently to Fontane, the neo-Aristotelian Hamburger does not explic-
itly rely on the principle of a mimesis understood as imitation, but rather 
on the presentation ofrealityl2. For Hamburger--and this crucial aspect is 
occasionally overlooked-the discussion of "appearance or semblance of 
reality" is completely independent of  the content of  the narrated, that is of 
the degree of  reality of  that, which, in literary fiction, is being narrated. In 
non-realistic forms of literature, e.g. fairy tale, science fiction, or fantasy, 
6  Genette (J993: 8). 
7  Vaihinger ( J  9 J J). 
8  Ingarden ( 1960). 
9  Hamburger (1993: 58). 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid. 
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the  speeifie  quality  of literary  fietion,  in  Hamburger's  fonnula~~on, is 
most clearly recognizable.  ;.' 
Even the fairy-tale appears as reality a reality as long as we, as we read it or watch it 
cnacted, allide within it; but rievcrtheless it does not appear as if  it were a reality. For 
inherent in the emaning of the as-if is the element of  deception, and in turn the refer-
ence  .t~. !1' reali.1:)'.  ~~ich is formulated in the irreal subjunctive precisely because as an 
as-if rea~~ty)t~.I!~t ~t  rea~~ty which ·it pretends to be. The as-reali\y, however, is 
semblance, the" i1fusion ofreality, which is called non-reality or  fictioD~ '.  '  .  ",.  ~ " .  ~ "':  .. ",.  ~:.",.  . .  : .  .  .. 
Bas~d  .on~~Jconcept of  literature as "presentation" (as oppos~d  to uimi_ 
tatio~'.'},  Ha-tp~rger' explains  literary  fiction  as  an  ima:glnarr objectiv-
ity-to  .u~eJl;pli{ase not·coined by.Hamburger herself. As such, literary 
fiction has a different status than deception because it is autonom~us, that 
is,  i~d~pe~.~~nt'of reality. Correspondingly, Hamburger distinguishes be-
tween  "fi~tj.,!.ous:~~  ~ ("as  ... if structure") in the sense of  "being feigned," ~d 
"fictive" (uas  ... stntcture~.')  .. The latter- is to be understood as an ·imaginary 
objeetiyity that does not appears differently than it is, namely "semblance 
ofreality,,14. 
The  outlined  theoretical assumptions  provide  the  basis  for  Ham-
burger's attempt to define epie fiction. She identifies linguistic properties 
of what she caUs "fictive narration"("fiktionales Erzählen")  I 
5 
• Among its 
particularities are: 
- a modification of the language's temporal system: The preterite indi-
cates, as epic preterite, a fictive presence. In so doing it loses its gram-
miltical function of  designating the·narrated events as past events
l6
; 
- a loss ofthe ordinary ("deictie, existential,,)17 function of  deictic spa-
~ial  and  temporal  adverbs  such  as  ·'today,"  ··yesterday,"  ·'tomorrow," 
"here," and uthere": These adverbsdo not refer to a place localized any-
where or at any time in  the historical reality of author and reader but 
13  Ibid.: 58f. 
14  Ibid.: 57f. 
15  Let us mention in passing that Hamburger takes only narratives with a specific gram-
matical form as "fictional," namely third person-narratives. On the reasons for this, at 
16  first glance, strange and oft-criticized limitation cf. Scheffel'(2003: particularly 143). 
See Hamburger (1993: 64ff.); Hamburger uses as evidence a phrase taken from a novel 
by Alice Berend: "Tomorrow was Christmas" ("Morgen war Weihnachten," ibid: 72). 
Here, the preterite and a future-tense adverb are combined in a single sentence. 
17  lbid.: 132.  . 
Narratology and Theory of  Fiction: Remarks on a Complex Relationship  225 
rather to the here and now of  the characters and thereby to a no-time and a 
no-where; 
- the use of  verbs of  inner action (verbs of  perception, thinking, sensa-
tion) in the third person
l8
• 
From the above characteristics, Hamburger deduees a categorical di f-
ference between fictional and non-fictional narration. She understands fic-
tional  narration  as  a  phenomenon  for  whose  identification  these 
presentation-related  charaeteristics  are  hoth  necessary  and  sufficient
l9
• 
For her utterance-related approach, the singular place of fictional narra-
tive in the general system of language connects ultimately two specifie 
qualities: 
1. Contrary to sentences in non-fictional narrative, as weil as those of 
literary narratives in first-person, sentences in third-person fictional narra-
tives are distinguished by the absence of  a stating subjeet. In this case, the 
modification of the temporal system of language, the loss of the deictie 
function of spatial and temporal adverbs, and the use of verbs of inner 
processes in the third person forbid to speak of areal or fictitious subject 
that would state these sentences at a definite time and in adefinite place 
and that would articulate a specific field of  experienee referring to a con-
crete person. Consequently, in the case of fictional narrative, there is no 
'·narrator" (in the sense of a fictitious  person bound to time and space), 
hut only the ·'narrating poet and his narrative acts'.2o. Yet Unarration" must 
be understood in a specific sense here since the historical author makes no 
statements. In other words, to quote Hamburger's formulation: ··Between 
the narrating and the narrated there exists not a subject-object-realation, 
i.e., a statement structure, but rather a funetional correspondence"21. Thus, 
narration appears  in this  special  case as  a  Ufunetion" that produces the 
narrated, '1he narrative function, which the narrative poet manipulates as, 
for example, the painter wields his colors and brushes,,22. 
18  Cf. ibid.: 81 tT., as weil as Hamburger's considerations of thc phcnomenon of narrated 
monologue ("erlebte Rede"), ibid.: 84fT. 
19  For pragmatic criticisms of Hamburger's position cf.  e.g.  Anderegg (1973:  100ff.); 
Bode (1988: 342f.); Gabriel (1975: 59ff.); Rasch (1961: 68-81) and Weinrich (1964: 
21tT.). 
20  Hamburger (1993: 140); with discussion of  examples. 
21  lbid.: 136. 
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2.  The presence of a fictitious "I-Origo" in fictional narratives corre-
sponds to the absence of adefinite stating subject. The "I-Origines" are 
understood  as  "reference or orientational  systems which  epistemologi-
caIly, and hence temporally  , have nothing to do with a real I who experi-
ences fiction in any way-in other words with the author or the reader,,23. 
The possibility of  such fictitious "I-Origines" establishes at the same time 
the distinctive achievement of  fictional narration: 
Epic fiction  is the sole instance where third-person figures can be spaken of not, or 
not only as objects, but also of  subjects, where the subjectivity of  a third-person figure 
qua that of  a third-person can be portrayei4•  . 
No~ if one compares the linguistic particularities which Hamburger 
determmes for the case of fictional narratives with her theoretical prem-
ises in Logik der Dichtung, it is clear that Hamburger does not fully ex-
haust  the  implications  of her  theory.  In  fact,  she  does  not  delineate 
entirely the logical consequences of  her incisive definition of literary fic-
tion as appearance of reality ("Schein der Wirklichkeit"), in the sense of 
an imaginary objectivity. Her definition of  the relationship between narra-
ti on and narrated, in the sense of  a functional connection, and her obser-
vatio~ of the  m~dification of the temporal  system of language applies 
only If we conslder the utterances of fictional  speech from outside,  Le. 
from  th~ir real  ~ont~xt and in their relationship with a historical reali~5. 
Accordmg to thlS  Vlew,  the author of a fictional narrative does not actu-
ally narrate something about characters, but ratber produces them narra-
tively. Thus, in the case of  fictional speech, the preterite does not refer to 
a historical past. 
Fictional speech is, to quote Dieter Janik, communicated communica-
ti on  ("kommunizierte Kommunikation")26.  As the literary theorist Felix 
Martinez-Bonati establisbed, we have to distinguish here between areal 
and an imaginary communicative context. According to the model of fic-
23  Ibid.: 74. 
~: Ibid.: 139. In the wake of  Hamburger cf. Cohn (1978). 
Hamburger thus takes into account what Dorrit Cohn calls "Referenzstufe," cf. Cohn 
(1990) and (1999). On Cohn's approach and its indebtness to Hamburger cf. "in detail 
Scheffel (2003). For arguments for the differentiability between historical and fictional 
narration see Dolezel (1997). Franz K.  Stanzei attempts to reconcile his dispute with 
~;)~bUrger about the existence of a fictional narrator, cf.  Stanzel (1989: particularly 
26  Cf. Janik (1973: 12). 
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tion developed by Martinez-Bonate
7
,  the author of a  fictional  narrative 
produces sentences that are "real" but "inauthentic"-since they are not to 
be understood as  the thoughts of the  author.  Simultaneously, the same 
sentences must be attributed to  the  fictional narrator as  "authentic'~ sen-
tences that are, however, "imaginary"-since they are conceived by the 
narrator, but only in the framework of  an imaginary communicative situa-
tion. Through the real writing of areal author a text emerges whose im-
aginarily  authentic  sentences  produce  an  imaginary  objectivity  that 
encompasses  a  fictional  communicative  situation,  a  fictional  narration, 
and a fictional narrated story. The fictional narrative is, at the same time, 
part of  areal and of an imaginary communication, and therefore consists 
both of  "real-inauthentic" and of  "imaginary-authentic" sentences (that is, 
imaginary "Wirklichkeitsaussagen" in Hamburger's sense). Given that the 
word "narrator" is an auxiliary term and does not necessarily designate a 
definite masculine or feminine  person  (since,  in  the  framework of tic-
tional narratives, inanimate objects, animals, collective, disembodied, or 
voices seemingly out of  the bounds of  time and space also narrate, a look 
at the stating authority in fictional narration would validate Jean Paul Sar-
tre's incisive formulation: "The author invents, the narrator teIls what has 
happened [  ...  ]. The author invents the narrator and the style of  the narra-
tion peculiar to the narrator.,,28 
This  "disjunctive  model,,29  (which,  incidentally,  also  delineates  the 
narratological model developed in our Einführung in die Erzähllheorie
Jo) 
leads to the following conc1usions: 
1. The narrative domains of  fictional and non-fictional narrative are to 
be separated strictly from each other. 
2.  Narrative fiction  encompasses significantly more than  Käte Ham-
burger and many of  her adepts formulate.  In addition to thc frequently re-
ferred-to absence of  an immediate field of  reference, and the possibility of 
a perspectivization and personalization of the narrated that are to be dis-
tinguished as much from the historical author as also from the voice of a 
fictitious stating authority, fictional narration provides a unique freedom. 
The position of the speaker as  weil  as that of the  Iistener of narrating 
27  Cf.  Martinez-Bonati  (1981)  and  (1996).  For  a  detailed  rcconstruction  cf.  Scheffel 
(1997: 34-39). 
28  Cf. Sartre (1988: 774). 
29  Cf. Cohn (1990). 
30  Cf. Martine71Scheffel (2003). 228  Matias Martinez, Michael Scheffel 
speech can be shaped freely without regard for the "natural" borders of 
physical and historical space and time. 
With respect to our opening question, this means: It is not only legiti-
mate but necessary to draw  an unambiguous theoretical  distinction  be-
tween fictional and non-fictional narratives, and to conceive of narrative 
theory as a genuine discipline within literary studies, as "fictional narra-
tology" focused on the specific aspects of fictional narration. Conversely, 
onIy a connection between narratology and theory of  fiction can cover the 
special status of  fictional narration, as opposed to non-fictional narration. 
2. 
In our discussion of the concepts of narrative and fictionality so far we 
have taken for gran  ted the validity of  the distinction between fictional and 
factual texts. We now want to examine this distinction in more detail in 
order to avoid possible misunderstandings of  our argument. 
Theories of tictionality-as we have seen in the cases of Käte Ham-
burger, Dorrit Coho, and John R.  Searl~tend  to divide all narratives into 
two  distinct  classes,  namely  fictional  and non-fictional  (henceforward: 
"factual") narratives. Tbe first class inc1udes novels, ballads, short stories 
etc., tbe second pieces of historiography, autobiography, and journalism. 
The division is taken to be mutually exclusive: any given narrative is sup-
posed to be either fictional or factual. 
Let us have a c10ser look now at borderline cases in order to test the 
distinction's validity. We will analyze some examples which we consider 
to be representative for basic aspects of literary communication like "au-
thor/narrator," "story" ("histoire"), "discourse" ("discours"), "reference," 
and "veritication." In the act of understanding individual narratives these 
aspects are, to be sure, mutually interconnected; if  we deal with them now 
separately one after another it is for analytic reasons only. For each of the 
aspects just mentioned we will provide examples which at first sight seem 
to subvert the distinction of fictional vs. factual.  We will limit ourselves 
to examples which approach and, perhaps, blur the borderline from the 
"factual" side, i.e. narratives which stern from genres or modes of  writing 
which are usually taken to be factual.  . 
(a) Firstly, let us consider an example for literary forgeries.  In 1995, 
the  hitherto  unknown  author  Binjamin  Wilkomirski  published  Bruch-
stücke. Aus einer Kindheit 1939-1948. Tbe book relates the cruel infancy 
of a jewish boy who  was  forced  to  live  in  Maidanek and Auschwitz-
Nanatology and Theory ofFiction: Remarlcs on a Complex Relationship  229 
Birkenau. It was received enthusiastically by the German critics. In 1998, 
however, the swiss journalist Daniel Ganzfried accused Wilkomirski of 
fraud. According to Ganzfried, Wilkomirski never experienced the Holo-
caust directly. lnstead, he was born under normal circumstances as Bruno 
Grosjean and raised in Switzerland by the couple Doesseker that adoptcd 
hirn and eventually endowed hirn with their last name. Although Wilko-
mirski/Grosjean/Doesseker insists upon the veracity of his memoirs until 
today, further publications confirmed Ganzfried's accusations.  Needless 
to  say, the early success of the book vanished after the disclosure of its 
true authorship31 • 
00 such cases of forged authorship, as some trendy dec1arations of  the 
death of the author might suggest, infringe the validity of the distinction 
between fictional and factual texts? Obviously not. If  we take it as a faith-
ful account of  authentic experiences of  the author, Bruchstücke belongs to 
the factual group of autobiographies anyway. Now the discovery of the 
fraud and bence the recognition that tbe text is but a pretended memoir do 
not transform the text into a piece of fictional literature. Faked autobiog-
raphies still remain, albeit in a parasitic way, within the realm of factual 
texts.  To pretend to  write,  like  Wilkomirski,  an  autobiography,  and to 
write a fiction novel, as Daniel Defoe did in Robinson Crusoe,  in auto-
biographical form, are two different things. The violent reactions, created 
from a sense of betrayal, which inevitably arise once a faked autobiogra-
phy is disc10sed as such verify quite c1early that the reading public does 
distinguish not only between fact and fiction (i.e. factual and fictional dis-
course) but also between fake and fiction. 
(b) Let us consider now some intratextual aspects of narratives. With 
regard  to  a  narrative's  discourse  ("discours")  some  factual  genres  are 
sometimes said to subvert the borderline towards fictional texts. Take the 
case of tbe New Joumalism. In the  1950ies, authors like Tom Wolfe or 
Gabriel Garcia Märquez began to utilize in their joumalistic writings nar-
rative techniques which by then had been conceived of  as signposts of  fic-
tionality-verbatim representation of dialogues which took place  in  the 
joumalist's absence and without having been mechanically documented, 
and, most importantly, devices of internal focalisation like interior mono-
logue,  stream of consciousness,  and  free  indirect  discourse
32
•  In  New 
31  See Mächler (2000). 
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Journalism, however, such devices appear in reportages which are meant 
to provide a factual representation of  events which really took place. One 
of the most prominent examples of this new kind of  journalistic writing 
was Truman Capote's In  Cold Blood (1965) which told the story of the 
murder of a Kansas farm  familiy  by two young men who subsequently 
were condemned to  death and eventually executed.· Its  subtitle, A  True 
Account 0/  a Multiple Murder and Its  Consequences, indicates .the undi-
minished claim for truth which is essential to the proper understanding of 
such pieces of narrative.  In  spite of the utilization of  devic~s of internal 
focalization etc., Capote aspired to tell the truth about the consciousness 
of the  murderers.  His justification for  the  veracity of the  thoughts and 
feelings he attributed to the persons portrayed in his book is based on the 
informations he gathered in  the  years of research he  invested into this 
murder case. Even though he could not possibly have direct access to the 
consciousness (or even to subconscious realms) of the persons involved 
(which only a god would have), he could make his depiction highly prob-
able by the hundreds of interviews he m~e  when studying this case. In 
order to check if a given narrative should be taken as  factual,  we only 
need to examine whether it would make sense to accuse the text of being 
mendacious or not in  case it depicted state of affairs and events which 
were  incompatible with  independent  trustworthy  informations.  In  texts 
like In Cold Blood, its "fictional" discoursive devices notwithstanding, a 
truth claim is obviously maintained. Thus we must conceive of  such texts 
as factual narratives. Their factual essence, by the way, would not change 
if we would discover that some statements or implications conveyed in 
the text were incompatible with our knowledge of  the events depicted. In-
deed, Capote has been called on some misleading assumptions he stated 
in In Cold Blootl
3
• In such cases, however, the text should be considered 
as a (partially) erroneous factual text rather than a fictional text. For po-
ets, as Sir Philip Sidney put it some centuries ago, cannot lie because they 
don 't affirm anything34. 
n  . 
See Hollowell (1977). 
34  "[ ... ] the Poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never Iieth. For, as I take it, to He, is to 
affinne that to be true, which is false.  So as the other artists, and especially the histo-
rian, affirming many things, can, in the cloudy knowledge of mankind, hardly escape 
from  many lies.  Dut the Poet (as I said before) never affirmeth [  ... ]," Sidney (1974: 
52f.). 
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Let us mention in passing that, in historiography, such seemingly 'fic-
tional' devices have always been used without damaging its truth claim. 
To provide an example from Classical Antiquity: in a weil known pas~age 
at the beginning of his  History 0/ the  Peloponnesian  War,  Thucydldes 
justifies his verbatim report of  speeches in terms of  probability: 
The speeches are reproduced here according to the way how. anybody under the .de-
scribed circumstances by necessity would have to speak, savmg as much as posslble 
ofthe essence ofthe things actually said (part I, chap. 22). 
Although the verbatim report of speeches, taken literally, presupposes 
the  superhuman memory of an  omniscient narrator-· -as  much as,  when 
presenting forms of internal focalization like interior monologue, a super-
human access to the consciousness of  others is presupposed-Thucydides 
nevertheless maintains his intention to give a factual account of  the events 
which took place during the Peloponnesian war. 
To sum up, the utilization of  devices which used to be (and sometimes 
still are) taken to be specific to fictional discourse which we find, e.g., in 
the New Joumalism, does not alter the truth claim of  such texts and hence 
its essentially factual status. 
(c) Let us turn to the aspect of content, Le.  the "story" ("histoire") of 
narratives. Are there borderline cases of factual narration, with regard to 
the immanent character of the events depicted, which would subvert the 
division  between  factual  and  fictional  narratives?  A  case  in  point one 
might think of is  historiographical  writing.  Since  the  1970ies,  Hayden 
White and others declare the inescapable "literariness" of historiographi-
cal writing and hence the untenability of a strict distinction between fac-
tual  and  fictional  narratives.  To  substantiate  this  claim,  White,  in  his 
influential  monograph  Metahistory  and  numcrous  subsequcot  publica-
tions, above all refers to forms of "emplotment" of the evcnts depicted in 
the  writing  of history.  "Emplotment,"  White  explains,  "is the  way by 
which a sequence of  events fashioned ioto a story is gradually revealed to 
be a story of  a particular kind,,3s.  He proposes four basic "modes of cm-
plotment" borrowed from  the literary critic Northrop Frye's Anatomy of 
Criticism (1957), namely Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, and Satire.  In his 
writings White tends to assimilate the structures of emplotment in histori-
ography and fiction to such an extent that differences between these two 
3S  White (1973:  7).  See also his essays "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact" and 
"The Fictions ofFactualRepresentation" in White (1978: 81-·100. 121-34). 232  Matfas Martfnez. Michael Scheffel 
kinds of narratives are  hardly  recognizable anymore.  His  insights con-
ceming the narrative structures used in historiography, however, do not 
allow for the conclusion that history writing is necessarily "literary" in the 
sense of ficticious.  Instead, what White discovers in the writings of  histo-
rians  are  structures  which  function  quite  independently of whether the 
text in question be factual or fictional. Of course any narrative possesses 
structural qualities and is, in this sense, "constructed". But its necessarily 
constructive character in  no  way precludes the possibility of fulfilling a 
referential function.  Plot structure and reference are two different aspects 
of  narratives which are compatible with each other. 
(d) Having discussed the two intratextual aspects discourse and story, 
we now turn again to an extratextual aspect, namely reference. Tbe cru-
cial  signpost of factual  narration is its reference to  reality.  Some years 
ago, Dorrit Cohn maintained for the case of  historiography: 
[  ... ] the idea that history is commited to verifiable documentation and that this com-
mitment is suspended in fiction has survived even the most radical dismantling of  the 
history/fiction distinction. In historiography the notion of referentiality [ ...  ] can, and 
indeed must, continue to inform the work of  practicioners who have become aware of 
h  bl  .  f·  .  36  t  e pro  ematlcs 0  narrative constructlOn  . 
As weIl is known, Cohn's piece de resistance for the definition of  fac-
tual narratives, namely its reference to reality, has encountered time and 
again severe criticism. Recently, widespread discussions about the appar-
ently simulated nature of today's "hyper-reality" seem to prohibit any re-
course to  reference  as  distinctive quality of factual  texts  in contrast to 
fictional ones. We cannot engage in this far-reaching discussion here. But 
let us at least consider one case in point. 
·'Borderline Journalism" is the name for a disputed kind of  joumalism 
that became widely known in German speaking countries and elsewhere 
only recently. Between 1995 and 1999, the swissjoumalist Tom Kummer 
published a number of interviews with Hollywood celebrities like Pamela 
Anderson, Kim Basinger, George Clooney, Brad Pitt, and Sharon Stone in 
renowned  German journals and  newspapers  including  the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung
37
•  In the year 2000, however, Kummer was accused of fraud.  It 
was  disclosed to  the  public  that many  interviews  had been written  by 
Kummer without ever meeting the stars, partly dra.wing from a number of 
36  Cohn (1990: 779). 
37  See Reus (2002). 
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different sources already published by others elsewhere, partly made up 
by Kummer himself. Now the interesting point in this case is not the fraud 
as such but the way how Kummer defended his procedure. He rejected the 
allegations declaring that, in  his  interviews, he never meant to present a 
verbatim report of actual conversations with individual stars.  Instead he 
intended  to  perfonn  a  "borderline-journalism"  in  order to  produce  an 
"implosion ofreality." Apparently Kummer referred to Jean Baudrillard's 
theory about an inescapable media-induced hyper-reality38. Now whatever 
the plausibility of  such theories which postulate the disappearance of  old-
fashioned reality in contemporary culture may be:  the unanimously hos-
tile reaction of the public and of fellow joumalists following thc disclo-
sure of the interviews's true nature clearly indicates that a strong feeling 
with regard to the crucial difference between factual and faked texts ex-
ists. Any further collaboration with Kummer was cancelled by the news-
papers and journals he  used to work for.  Moreover, the two directors of 
the "Magazin" of  the Süddeutsche Zeitung responsible for the publication 
of  Kummer' s texts eventually were fired. Again, as in the other cases ana-
lyzed above,  it  did  make  a difference  whether these  interviews  which 
were taken by the readers to be factual did indeed refer to real conversa-
tions or not. 
(  e) A final aspect, to be distinguished from the aspect of  reference dis-
cussed above, concems a pragmatic  aspect of story-telling,  namely the 
provableness ofthe story's truth claim. A case in point are urban legends. 
Such narratives,  extremely popular nowadays,  relate  stories  about van-
ished hitchhikers who turn up dead, venomous spiders hidden in incon-
spicuous  yucca  palms,  or sexual  encounters  with  strangers  leading  to 
infection  with  HIV.  Urban  legends  are  situated in  the everyday  world. 
They deal  with  the  things  we  like  to  eat and drink.  with  relatives  and 
friends,  with our pets and cars; they  occur at places where we  live and 
where we go  on holiday to,  at the  schools and universities we work at; 
they are connected with the activities which we eam our I  iving by; they 
happen to people like you and me. Now urban legends fluctuate between 
factual account and mere fiction. At first sight, they seem to be truc repre-
sentations of unique experiences; they are told as if they were truthful ac-
counts of something that really happened.  In most cases, however, they 
can be shown to be variants ofwidespread legends. In order to clarify this 
38  . 
Kummer (2000: I 10). See Baudnllard ( 1981 ). 234  Matias Martinez, Michael Scheffel 
ambiguity let us have a closer look at how urban legends are being com-
municated
39
•  The narration typically begins with a claim for credibility. 
The narrator informs the listener that he has heard the story from a friend 
of his who has a friend who experienced the story personally. Hence the 
story's truth-claim is established by reference to a witness of the events. 
This witness, however, is  never present at the moment when the urban 
legend is told. The proof ofthe story's truth remains, so to speak, always 
two or three instances away. This initial assertion of truthfulness is such 
an  essential  feature of urban  legends that they have been called "foaf-
tales," with "foar' standing for "friend of  a friend." Thus, when conveyed 
in  face-to-face-communication,  urban  legends have to be understood as 
factual narratives. Their specific feature in this respect, however, consists 
in their permanent deferral of provableness. It isnot necessary for an ur-
ban legend, in order to be effective, that its truth be proven. These narra-
tives belong to the realm of  unproven certainties we live by. They are, one 
might say, not true yet certain. 
In the latter half of  our paper we have analyzed some examples of fac-
tual narratives which, with regard to essential textual and pragmatic as-
pects of narratives, seem at first sight to subvert the distinction between 
fictional and factual narratives. Our analysis has shown, however, that far 
from abandoning the referential function they adhere to a truth-claim that 
separates them quite clearly from fictional forms of narrative. We arrive 
to  the conclusion that, contrary to some trendy commonplaces in  recent 
cultural criticism, the distinction remains basically valid also with regard 
to such borderliners. Fictional narratives possess specific features which 
separate them from factual narratives. Therefore, an appropriate analysis 
of  fictional narratives requires not only a (general) theory of  narration but 
also a theory of fictionality. The phenomenon of fictionality is complex 
bccause it involves different aspects of narrative and its communication. 
Hence also the borderline between factual and fictional narratives should 
be  conceived of as  a bundle of different aspects each of which can be 
foregrounded in a specific manner by narrative texts. Therefore we must 
distinguish between different ways of  transgressions of  the borderline be-
tween  fictional  and factual  narratives  with respect to  a  narrative's au-
thor/narrator, discourse, content, reference, and provableness. 
39  See Bennett (1996). 
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